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Abstract
We show that firm‐specific information is more likely to be incorporated into stock prices when firms have
stronger shareholder coordination. The premise of our work is that geographic proximity reduces
communication costs among shareholders, thereby leading to better coordination. The positive coordination‐
informativeness relation is driven mainly by shareholder coordination among dedicated and independent
institutions. We further show that the positive effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance
mechanisms, suggesting that shareholder coordination could serve as a substitute conduit of price discovery.
Lastly, we propose that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness through the channel of
enhanced voluntary disclosure quality.
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INTRODUCTION
A number of studies highlight that equity ownership by institutional investors has explosively increased over the
last 20 years in the U.S. stock market.[1] In addition, corporate ownership structure has become more dispersed
in terms of the number and types of institutional investors.[2] Financial theory suggests that when ownership is
dispersed among many small individual shareholders, corporate governance benefits from the existence of large
shareholders (e.g., Maug, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986 ) who are often institutions (e.g., Hartzell & Starks, 2003
; Kahn & Winton, 1998 ). Institutional investors actively engage in the monitoring of self‐serving managers,
acting as a disciplinary mechanism that attenuates agency costs (e.g., Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007; Gillan & Starks,
2000 ). Past studies on the effectiveness of institutional investors in corporate governance have mostly focused
on institutions’ information‐gathering and analytical abilities (e.g., Ayers, Ramalingegowda, & Yeung, 2011;
Chhaochharia, Kumar, & Niessen‐Ruenzi, 2012), but have largely overlooked the importance of coordination
among institutional shareholders. Shareholder coordination, if in place, can facilitate the cooperation among the
institutional investors and thereby enhance monitoring effectiveness by significantly weakening the free‐rider
problem which aggravates agency conflicts (Grossman & Hart, 1980). This notion is supported by survey
evidence documented by McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2010) showing that 59% of institutional investors
among respondents consider coordination with other institutional investors as a way to improve monitoring of
managers.
In this article, we study the role of shareholder coordination, proxied by geographic proximity among prominent
shareholders such as institutional investors, in increasing a firm's transparency and in encouraging the
incorporation of more firm‐specific information into stock prices. Monitoring effort and effectiveness is
intensified through the coordination among shareholders (e.g., Huang, 2013). As a result, managers under
scrutiny are more likely to disclose timely and quality information to the public. On the one hand, uninformed
investors drawn by trustworthy public information are more likely to possess ownership and thereby
incorporate firm‐specific information into stock prices. On the other hand, informed investors are more
incentivized to collect private firm‐specific information as the marginal benefits of trading with uninformed
investors increase. Kyle (1985) demonstrates that private information is incorporated into stock prices through
trades placed by informed traders. In other words, we hypothesize that the positive impact of shareholder
coordination on stock price informativeness is achieved through greater corporate disclosure by revealing more
firm‐specific information to the market and encouraging more collection of private information at reduced cost.
To measure the degree of coordination at the firm level, we calculate the average of the geographic distance
among institutional investors weighted by ownership. The rationale of our proxy lies in the fact that institutional
investors are more likely to coordinate their corporate monitoring efforts when potential connections between
them become more likely with proximity. Social network literature suggests that social networks are more likely
to develop when there is homophily, i.e. the tendency of individuals to associate and bond with others driven by
familiarity, often emanating from geographic proximity.[3] Since the weighted average of distance is inversely
associated with the level of coordination, we multiply it by −1 for convenience sake. Therefore, the coordination
measure is the inverse of the weighted average of the geographic distance among institutional shareholders
(hereafter 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶).

Our baseline results show the positive relation between the shareholder coordination and the stock price
informativeness, measured as idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼).[4] Existing literature shows that dedicated (e.g.,
Bushee, 1998) and independent institutional investors (e.g., Brickley, Lease, & Smith, 1988 ) are more active

monitors[5] than their counter peers (transient and grey institutional investors). We further find that the
positive relation between coordination and stock price informativeness is driven mainly by the coordination
among dedicated and independent institutional investors. Our finding supports the notion that coordination
among active monitors enhances monitoring effectiveness and thereby improves a firm's information
environment.
Next, we examine whether there is a complement or substitution effect between shareholder coordination and
other governance mechanisms that have been shown to be related with stock price informativeness.[6] The
literature has shown that governance mechanisms such as antitakeover provisions (Ferreira & Laux, 2007),
board gender diversity (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011), and blockholder ownership (Brockman & Yan, 2009) are
significantly positively related to price informativeness. Our results show that the impact of shareholder
coordination on price informativeness is more pronounced in firms with weaker alternative governance
mechanisms. More specifically, firms with more antitakeover provisions, poison pill provision, low board gender
diversity, and low blockholder ownership exhibit more significant and stronger coordination‐informativeness
relation, suggesting that shareholder coordination acts as a substitute for other existing governance
mechanisms.
Although our findings indicate that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness, it is plausible
that some visible and invisible omitted variables could drive our results. For example, our coordination variable
could merely capture the same effect of local ownership on corporate disclosure quality. Meanwhile, the
invisible time‐invariant factors such as corporate culture could also explain our results, simply because firms
with ethical culture are more likely to deliver reliable information to investors. Therefore, to mitigate the
omitted variable concern, we take the following steps: (1) we include in our results the model specification with
firm fixed effects that absorbs the effects of time‐invariant factors; and (2) we control for more variables such as
ownership of different types of institutional investors, board characteristics, and managerial ownership in our
regressions. Our baseline results continue to hold after controlling for these variables. Another explanation for
our finding is that shareholders that are geographically clustered simultaneously invest in stocks that display a
high level of stock price informativeness, leading to strong shareholder coordination. To address the reverse
causality issue, we conduct three additional analyses: lead‐lag analysis, change‐on‐change analysis, and GMM
analysis. The results confirm that shareholder coordination leads to informative stock prices, but not vice versa.
Finally, we explore the potential mechanism through which shareholder coordination improves stock price
informativeness. We focus on examining whether shareholder coordination enhances corporate voluntary
disclosure. It is well established in the literature that corporate voluntary disclosure can improve price
informativeness. For example, Haggard, Martin, and Pereira (2008) uncover a positive relation between
corporate voluntary disclosure and price informativeness. Drawing from the literature (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, &
Sengupta, (2005) ; Bamber & Cheon, 1998; Lennox & Park, 2006), we use the frequency of management
earnings forecasts to capture the extent of voluntary disclosure. We find that shareholder coordination has a
positive impact on the frequency of management earnings forecasts. Moreover, the positive relation is primarily
driven by firms with large size, indicating that shareholder coordination affects voluntary disclosure differently
for firms of different sizes. Further, after including management earnings forecasts, the coordination‐
informativeness relation still holds, but is more pronounced in small firms. Taken together, our results imply that
for large firms, shareholder coordination enhances price informativeness mainly by inducing managers to
increase value‐relevant voluntary disclosures, whereas for small firms, shareholder coordination affects price
informativeness by facilitating price information collection and incorporation. To further bolster our findings in
channel tests, we provide additional evidence by showing that shareholder coordination also positively affects
two alternative measures of voluntary disclosure (management forecast occurrence and forecast precision).

Overall, our results suggest that shareholder coordination affects price informativeness through enhancing
corporate disclosure quality.
The contribution of our study is threefold. Firstly, we extend the literature that has provided mixed evidence on
the relation between governance mechanisms and stock price informativeness. For example, Ferreira and Laux
(2007) find that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions display higher levels of price informativeness.
Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders increase the probability of informed trading and
idiosyncratic volatility. Gul et al. (2011) find that stock prices of firms with gender‐diverse boards reflect more
firm‐specific information. Conversely, Ferreira, Ferreira, and Raposo (2011) find a negative relation between
price informativeness and board independence, suggesting a substitution effect between board independence
and price informativeness. Our paper makes an important contribution to the literature by documenting that
shareholder coordination, serving as an internal governance mechanism, is positively associated with stock price
informativeness.
Secondly, there is also an ongoing debate about whether more corporate transparency leads to greater stock
price informativeness. While the conventional wisdom is that corporate transparency facilitates more firm‐
specific information incorporation into stock prices (e.g., Gelb & Zarowin, (2002), Dasgupta, Gan, and Gao (2010)
theoretically and empirically show that stock price informativeness can decrease when corporate transparency
improves. Our paper makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate by demonstrating that corporate
transparency driven by shareholder coordination is positively associated with the incorporation of firm‐specific
information into stock prices.
Thirdly, our study also adds to the literature on the role of geographic proximity in information gathering and
effective monitoring. Prior literature has documented that geographic proximity between firms and
shareholders facilitates private information collection and monitoring effort (e.g., Ayers et al., 2011;
Chhaochharia et al., 2012). Our findings extend the literature by showing that geographic proximity between a
firm's institutional investors can not only improve institutions’ monitoring effectiveness but also corporate
transparency, and therefore it can have important implications for market efficiency. It is also noteworthy that
our paper is different from Huang (2013) in that we focus on investigating whether the degree of shareholder
coordination can affect a firm's transparency and thereby encourage the incorporation of more firm‐specific
information into stock prices, whereas the goal of Huang (2013) is to determine whether shareholder
coordination affects firm value.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section describes the sample, measurement of variables,
and summary statistics. Section contains empirical results. Section provides robustness checks. Section discusses
a possible mechanism. Second 6 includes concluding remarks.

SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS
Sample selection
We draw data from the Center for Research in Stock Prices (CRSP), Compustat, Thomson Reuters F13
Institutional Holdings, Execucomp and I/B/E/S databases. We place two filters to obtain the final sample: (1) to
alleviate market microstructure‐related concerns, we focus on S&P 1500 firms; (2) financial firms (SIC 6000–
6999) and utilities (SIC 4900–4999) are excluded from the sample because their capital market behaviors are
fundamentally different from that of other firms due to regulation and the financial nature of their operations.
Our final sample includes 19,028 firm‐year observations for the period from 1994 to 2010. The institutional
investor classification data is from Brian Bushee's website (http://0acct.wharton.upenn.edu.libus.csd.mu.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html).[7] We also augment our sample with
corporate board data extracted from Compact Disclosure and IRRC and management earnings forecast data

from First Call. We winsorize all continuous variables at the bottom and top 1% level. Appendix includes detailed
variable definitions.

Variable construction
Shareholder coordination
To measure geographic proximity among institutional shareholders, we first identify the location of institutions
by collecting their headquarters’ zip code from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) documents (SEC
Edgar). We obtain the latitude and longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau's Gazetteer
Place and Zip Code Database. Following prior research (e.g., Coval & Moskowitz, 2001), we calculate the
distance between institution 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 using the following standard formula:

𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 = 𝑟𝑟 × arcos{cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 )cos(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 )cost�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 �cos �𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑗𝑗 � +
cos (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 )sin(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ) cos�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 �sin�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 � + sin (𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 ) sin(𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑗 ), (1)

where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is distance in statutory miles, 𝑟𝑟 denotes the radius of the Earth (approximately 3,963 statutory miles),
and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 are latitudes and longitudes of institution headquarters.

For each firm‐quarter and institutional investor in the firm, we first calculate the geographic distance between
the institution and all other institutional investors in the firm, weighted by their respective fractional holdings of
the total institutional ownership in the firm. We then take the product of −1 with the logarithm‐transformed
fractional holdings weighted‐average of these distances across all institutional shareholders of the firm to obtain
the geographic‐proximity‐based shareholder coordination measure for each firm‐quarter.[8] The weighting
scheme delivers a more accurate gauge of coordination than the simple average of the distances among
institutions, because it accounts for the fact that institutions with large shareholdings typically have a more
substantial impact on corporate governance. Specifically, the geographic‐proximity‐based shareholder
coordination measure is designed as follows:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = −𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (1 + ∑𝑖𝑖𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 ∑𝑗𝑗𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 ), (2)

where 𝛼𝛼 is the set of institutional investors, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the ownership weight of institution 𝑖𝑖 in the total ownership
held by all institutions in a firm at the end of each quarter, and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖.𝑗𝑗 is the geographic distance between
institution 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The logarithm transformation, log (1 + weighted‐average of geographic distance between
institutions) serves the purpose of reducing the skewness of this variable's distribution.

Stock price informativeness

We use idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) and probability of informed trading (PIN) as our proxies for stock price
informativeness. French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) state that idiosyncratic volatility, defined as stock return
variation unexplained by market movements, measures the rate of firm‐specific information impounded into
stock prices. Previous empirical studies support the view that idiosyncratic volatility measures the rate of
information flow into stock prices. For instance, Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) show that the stock
prices of firms with more idiosyncratic volatility embed more information about future earnings. Idiosyncratic
volatility is also commonly used in empirical studies to proxy for the informativeness of stock prices (e.g.,
Ferreira & Laux, 2007; Ferreira et al., 2011).
We estimate annual firm‐specific idiosyncratic volatility by regressing stock returns on the three Fama‐French
2
model factors. For each firm‐year, firm‐specific return variation is estimated by 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
from the regression:
𝑓𝑓

𝑓𝑓

𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 �𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 − 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑺𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑡𝑡 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (3)

𝑓𝑓

where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the return of stock 𝑖𝑖 in day 𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 is the risk‐free rate of return in day 𝑡𝑡, 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 is the value‐weighted
market return, SMB (small minus big) is the difference between the daily returns of the small and big of a firm's
portfolios, and HML (high minus low) is the difference between the daily returns of high book‐to‐market and low
2
2
book‐to‐market of a firm's portfolios. Since 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
is skewed, we take the logistic transformation of 1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
to
ensure greater resemblance to a normal distribution. Formally, idiosyncratic volatility 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is defined as:

Summary statistics

Table 1 presents summary statistics. The mean value of idiosyncratic volatility (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is 1.329 with a standard
deviation of 1.397. The mean value of 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 is 0.149 with a standard deviation of 0.074. Both variables exhibit
similar descriptive statistics as those in Ferreira and Laux (2007). The average geographic‐proximity‐based
shareholder coordination (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) is −6.480. Our coordination measure exhibits a fair degree of cross‐sectional
variation across our sample firms. Table 1 also presents summary statistics for other control variables. In
particular, institutional shareholders, on average, own 64.5% of the outstanding shares of the average firm.
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Variable
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 ($ 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑔𝑔
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷

N
Mean
Median Std Dev
Min.
Max.
19,028
−6.480 −6.551
0.504 −23.600
−0.071
19,028
−6.109 −6.169
0.622 −23.034
0.000
19,028
−5.038 −5.075
1.022 −20.717
0.000
19,028
−5.139 −5.195
1.083 −20.763
0.000
19,028
−5.778 −5.926
1.564 −17.817
0.000
19,028
1.329
1.168
1.397 −1.097
7.527
19,028
0.645
0.675
0.211
0.008
0.964
19,028 4277.700 858.870 13336.990
3.432 275644.000
19,028
0.956
0.906
0.751 −1.172
3.323
19,028
0.073
0.116
0.440 −4.383
2.433
19,028
0.290
0.067
1.103
0.007
14.137
19,028
0.197
0.181
0.173
0.000
2.616
19,028
29.668 25.000
16.179
3.000
62.000
19,028
0.490
0.000
0.500
0.000
1.000
19,028
0.935
1.000
0.247
0.000
1.000
19,028
1.861
1.878
0.116
1.015
2.127
19,028
11.594
9.000
9.132
0.000
62.000
19,028 172.156 119.000
170.263 11.000
957.000
19,028
0.440
0.455
0.181
0.030
0.807
19,028
0.053
0.015
0.082
0.000
0.891
19,028
0.425
0.429
0.184
0.024
0.815
12,836
9.012
9.000
2.404
1.000
22.000
12,836
0.668
0.700
0.174
0.000
1.000
12,836
0.089
0.091
0.093
0.000
1.000
11,589
0.031
0.005
0.072
0.000
1.593
19,028
0.149
0.135
0.074
0.000
1.000
19,028
1.310
0.000
2.190
0.000
9.000
19,028
0.926
1.000
0.261
0.000
1.000
19,028
0.372
0.000
0.483
0.000
1.000
19,028
0.189
0.000
0.391
0.000
1.000
18,300
0.012
0.006
0.048
0.000
4.105
19,028
0.570
1.000
0.495
0.000
1.000

𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙
16,747
0.361
0.163
0.669
0.012
4.893
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎
19,028
1.073
1.002
0.567 −1.157
4.440
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷
19,028
0.654
1.000
0.476
0.000
1.000
Note: This table presents descriptive statistics of our sample firms. Please refer to Appendix A for variable
definitions.
Table 2 shows the correlation matrix. The stock price informativeness measures, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃, are positively and
significantly correlated with each other. The correlations between shareholder coordination and both stock
price informativeness measures are positive and significant, consistent with our prediction that firms with a
higher degree of shareholder coordination are associated with more informative stock prices.

Table 2 Correlation matrix
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(1) 𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉
1.000
(2) 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷
0.127 1.000
(3) 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑛𝑛
−0.439 −0.178 1.000
(4) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)
−0.549 −0.155 0.340 1.000
(5) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)
−0.176 −0.176 −0.031 −0.010 1.000
(6) 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐸𝐸
−0.127 −0.100 0.110 0.139 0.167 1.000
(7) 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)
0.061 0.034 −0.087 −0.081 0.182 −0.155 1.000
(8) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑒𝑒
0.012 0.007 0.048 0.319 −0.079 −0.043 0.081 1.000
(9) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹) − 0.266 0.044 0.168 0.464 −0.145 0.083 −0.081 0.134 1.000
(10) 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑚𝑚
−0.120 −0.005 −0.029 0.348 −0.022 0.117 −0.091 0.162 0.459 1.000
(11) 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑔𝑔
0.129 −0.010 −0.045 −0.158 −0.006 −0.031 −0.009 −0.069 −0.099 −0.054 1.000
(12) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)
−0.040 −0.066 0.015 −0.068 −0.007 −0.037 −0.003 −0.032 −0.141 −0.123 0.009 1.000
(13) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿)
−0.389 −0.215 0.205 0.587 0.277 0.101 −0.057 0.028 0.066 0.061 −0.036 0.080 1.000
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients under the null hypothesis of no correlation between variables employed. Values in bold type
have a p‐value less than 5%.

EMPIRICAL REGRESSION MODELS AND RESULTS
In this section, we establish our baseline model and provide regression evidence on the relation between
shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness.

Impact of shareholder coordination on stock price informativeness
Empirical design: baseline model
We estimate the following baseline empirical model to analyze the relation between shareholder coordination
and stock price informativeness.

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽8 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽11 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (5)
where 𝑖𝑖 indexes firm, 𝑗𝑗 indexes industry, and 𝑡𝑡 indexes year. Industry/firm and year indicators are denoted by
𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 and 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 , respectively. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the geographic‐proximity‐based shareholder coordination measures for firm 𝑖𝑖
at year 𝑡𝑡 − 1. We include a number of control variables drawn from the literature on price informativeness.
These control variables include institutional ownership (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇), natural logarithm of total assets
(𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)), natural logarithm of market‐to‐book ratio (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)), firm profitability (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅), profits volatility
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)), leverage (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿), natural logarithm of firm age (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)), a dividend payer dummy
(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷), an internal diversification dummy (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀), the weighted average distance between institutions
and a firm's headquarters (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)) and the natural logarithm of number of analysts following the firm in a
year (Analyst). Year dummies are included to account for pervasive macroeconomic factors that could affect the
cross‐section of firms, and industry or firm dummies are included to control for the unobservable industry or
firm characteristics that could drive our results. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level to control for time
series dependence within the firm that could bias the statistics, as suggested in Petersen (2009) and Thompson
(2011).

Regression results
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 present the baseline regression results on the relation between shareholder
coordination and idiosyncratic volatility 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 estimated from equation (3). Column (1) controls for industry fixed
effects. To alleviate the problem of omitted variables that could drive our results, we control for firm fixed
effects in column (2). Both specifications deliver consistent results: shareholder coordination is positively and
significantly correlated with idiosyncratic volatility 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. Specifically, the coefficient estimate on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 in column
(1) ((2)) is 0.106 (0.067) with a 𝑡𝑡‐statistic of 4.34 (2.65). Our results are also economically significant. A one‐
standard‐deviation increase in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 increases 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 by nearly 5% in the case of the specification shown in
column (1) and 3% for the one shown in column (2).

Table 3 Baseline regression
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕
(1)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
0.106***
(4.34)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1
−0.569***
(− 9.11)

(2)
0.067***
(2.65)
−0.837***
(− 9.46)

−0.344*** −0.265***
(− 27.37)
(− 9.91)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.419*** −0.423***
(− 24.45)
(− 22.44)
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1
−0.035*
−0.072***
(− 1.65)
(− 3.16)
0.055*** 0.058***
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑡𝑡−1
(5.87)
(5.69)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
0.939*** 0.712***
(13.76)
(8.17)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.032*
0.064
(− 1.65)
(0.99)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
−0.038
−0.009
(− 1.46)
(− 0.25)
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
−0.015
−0.046
(− 0.38)
(− 0.96)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.179*
−0.293
(− 1.66)
(− 0.67)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1 −0.177*** −0.096***
(− 9.48)
(− 4.72)
Constant
6.796*** 6.100***
(23.76)
(7.26)
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
No
Firm FE
No
Yes
Observations
19,028
19,028
0.646
0.765
Adj. R2
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a proxy for stock price
informativeness; 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝑅𝑅 2 ]/𝑅𝑅2 ). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the weighted average
distances among institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1. Detailed definitions of other variables are listed
in Appendix A. Industry (i.e., the first two‐digit SIC code), firm, and year dummies are included, but coefficient
estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐statistics calculated using standard errors
adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test
significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1

One noteworthy finding in Table 3 is the negative effect of institutional ownership (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) on price
informativeness (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). At first glance, this result may appear counterintuitive given the evidence documented in
the literature that institutional investors promote corporate governance and information transparency.
However, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) argue that although institutional investors could potentially increase
the access to firm‐specific information by effective monitoring, they may also facilitate information transfer
across different firms within their investment portfolios, leading to more stock price synchronicity. Our finding is
consistent with the latter argument. The negative relation between firm size (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)) and price
informativeness (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) is consistent with the finding in Ferreira and Laux (2007).

Impact of shareholder coordination on stock price informativeness: the role of different
...
Existing literature shows that different types of shareholders may differ in their incentives and abilities to play a
governance role. Therefore, it is also possible that the strength of shareholder coordination might vary

depending on the type of institutions involved. To investigate this issue, we first follow Brickley et al. (1988) and
classify institutions into independent and grey institutions according to their potential for having business ties to
the firm. Independent institutions include mutual funds and investment advisory firms, which are likely to have
fewer potential business relationships with the corporations in which they invest. Grey institutions include bank
trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions, which have current or prospective business relationships
with corporations in which they invest. We then construct separate shareholder coordination measures among
independent and grey institutions, respectively. We expect that stronger coordination is more likely to develop
among institutions not subject to conflicts of interest or legal constraints associated with having a business
relationship with the firm. Accordingly, we predict that the effect of shareholder coordination on stock price
informativeness should be driven mainly by independent institutions. The results shown in columns (1) and (3) in
Table 4 are consistent with our expectation: coordination among independent institutional investors is the main
driver of our findings. Moreover, in Table 4, the coefficient equality tests between coordination among
independent institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ) and coordination among grey institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) further confirm
that coordinated independent institutions play a more important role in enhancing the informativeness of stock
prices.
Table 4 Baseline regression: by institution type
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕
0.062***
0.044**
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
(3.45)
(2.46)
0.004
0.001
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
(0.46)
(0.07)
0.019**
0.019**
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
(2.22)
(2.24)
−0.009
−0.013**
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
(− 1.43)
(− 2.02)
[0.02]
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 [< 0.01]
[< 0.01]
[< 0.01]
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇
Firm Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
No
No
Firm FE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Observations
19,028
19,028 19,028 19,028
0.645
0.645
0.765
0.765
Adj. R2
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions using geographic proximity partitioned by types of
institutional shareholders. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝑅𝑅 2 ]/𝑅𝑅2 ). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 are the weighted average distances among independent and grey institutional shareholders and
multiplied by −1, respectively. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are the weighted average distances among
dedicated and transient institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1, respectively. Detailed definitions of
other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm‐level controls used in
Table 3 are included, but coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐
statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 𝑃𝑃‐
values of coefficient equality tests are given in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Second, following Bushee (2001), we classify institutions into dedicated and transient institutions. Dedicated
institutions’ investments are associated with low turnover, low diversification, and a long investment horizon.
Therefore, dedicated institutions are more likely to play an important role in corporate monitoring and to be

proponents of a better informational environment for the firms in which they invest. Transient institutions,
which are characterized by high turnover, high diversification, and a short investment horizon, are less likely to
engage in corporate governance and less likely to espouse the view that benefits from an improved information
environment significantly outweigh the costs associated with promoting informativeness.
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 4 present the results of the regressions that include shareholder coordination
measures among dedicated and transient institutions. Consistent with the notion that dedicated institutions are
more effective monitors and promoters of a transparent information environment of firms they invest in, we
find that only coordination among dedicated institutions has a significant positive impact on stock price
informativeness. It is noteworthy that coordination among transient institutions exhibits either a significant
negative or an insignificant effect on stock price informativeness. The coefficient equality tests in Table 4
provide further support to the notion that coordination among dedicated institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) is more
effective at promoting stock price informativeness than transient institutions (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇).
To summarize, we find that stock price informativeness varies with shareholder coordination by different
institution types in systematic ways that are consistent with the view that a higher degree of shareholder
coordination encourages the collection and incorporation of private information, and thereby leads to more
informative stock prices.

Subsample analysis
To explore whether shareholder coordination is a substitute or complement of alternative corporate governance
mechanisms, we employ subsample analysis in this subsection. Literature has shown that a variety of
governance mechanisms are significantly positively related to price informativeness. For example, Ferreira and
Laux (2007) find that firms with fewer antitakeover provisions display a higher level of price informativeness.
Brockman and Yan (2009) find that blockholders increase the probability of informed trading and
idiosyncratic volatility. Gul et al. (2011) find that stock prices of firms with gender‐diverse boards reflect more
firm‐specific information. More specifically, we examine the effect of shareholder coordination on price
informativeness in subsamples classified by governance index, poison pill provision, board gender diversity, and
blockholder ownership.
We first hypothesize that shareholder coordination exerts a more significant influence on price informativeness
when a firm has more antitakeover provisions or poison pill provision. To test our hypothesis, we first divide the
sample into two groups on the basis of the median value of governance index (G‐index). Then we run the
baseline model for each subsample. The results in Panel A of Table 5 provide evidence in support of our
hypothesis. The 𝑝𝑝‐value of 𝑡𝑡‐statistics for cross‐equation coefficient tests further corroborates our findings that
shareholder coordination is more effective when corporate governance is weaker. We obtain consistent results
when we divide sample firms by the presence of poison pill provision. The results in Panel B of Table 5 indicate
that the coordination‐informativeness relation is stronger when firms have the poison pill provision.
Table 5 Sub‐sample analysis
Panel A: Corporate Governance
(Gindex)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
Firm Controls

(1)

(2)

(3)

Weak
0.138***
(2.63)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
[< 0.01]
Yes

Strong
−0.008
(− 0.23)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
[< 0.01]
Yes

Weak
Strong
0.133** −0.005
(2.10)
(− 0.12)
Yes

(4)

Yes

Year FE & Industry FE
Year FE & Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R2
Panel B: Poison Pill Provision
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
Firm Controls
Year FE & Industry FE
Year FE & Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R2
Panel C: Female Board
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
Firm Controls
Year FE & Industry FE
Year FE & Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R2
Panel D: Blockholder Ownership

Yes
No
4,455
0.601

Yes
No
6,159
0.603

No
Yes
4,455
0.726

No
Yes
6,159
0.720

Yes
0.139**
(2.02)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
[< 0.01]
Yes
Yes
No
7,005
0.619

No
−0.024
(− 0.84)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 = 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
[< 0.01]
Yes
Yes
No
3,609
0.593

Yes
0.195*
(1.90)

No
0.034
(0.72)

Yes
No
Yes
7,005
0.748

Yes
No
Yes
3,609
0.735

High
0.031
(0.82)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
[< 0.01]
Yes
Yes
No
6,209
0.604

Low
0.126***
(4.54)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
[0.02]
Yes
Yes
No
6,627
0.610

High
0.008
(0.19)

Low
0.088***
(2.70)

Yes
No
Yes
6,209
0.776

Yes
No
Yes
6,627
0.789

High
Low
High
Low
0.123**
0.299***
0.046
0.166**
(2.44)
(5.37)
(0.66)
(2.29)
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐻𝐻0 : 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ = 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
[0.08]
[0.04]
Firm Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year FE & Industry FE
Yes
Yes
No
No
Year FE & Firm FE
No
No
Yes
Yes
Observations
5,754
5,817
5,754
5,817
0.565
0.619
0.685
0.743
Adj. R2
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proxy for stock price
informativeness, IV. IV is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝑅𝑅2 ]/𝑅𝑅2 ). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is the weighted
average distances among institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1. In Panel A, we divide sample firms into
weak and strong groups of corporate governance (G‐index). The high (or low) group is defined as firms with G‐
index greater (or less) than its median value. In Panel B, we divide sample firms into groups with and without
poison pill provision. In Panel C, we divide sample firms into high and low groups of female directors. The high
(or low) group is defined as firms with the percentage of female directors greater (or less) than its median value.
In Panel D, we divide sample firms into high and low groups of blockholder ownership. The high (or low) group is
defined as firms with blockholder ownership above (or below) the median value. Detailed definitions of other
variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm characteristics used in Table 3 are
included, but coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐statistics calculated
using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. 𝑃𝑃‐values of coefficient
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1

equality tests are given in square brackets. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test significance level at 1%, 5%,
and 10%, respectively.
Given the findings in Gul et al. (2011), similarly, we hypothesize that shareholder coordination plays a substitute
role when coexisting with the price discovery channel of board gender diversity. In other words, the effect of
shareholder coordination becomes stronger when a firm's board is less gender‐diverse. Panel C of Table 5
reports supportive evidence. The 𝑝𝑝‐value of 𝑡𝑡‐statistics for cross‐equation coefficient tests support the notion
that shareholder coordination is a substitute for the alternative information generating mechanism (board
gender diversity).
Last, we explore whether there is indeed a substitution effect between shareholder coordination and
blockholders. We then divide the sample on the basis of median value of blockholder ownership. Our results in
Panel D of Table 5 show that the impact of shareholder coordination on price informativeness is stronger
(weaker) in the subsample where blockholders have a weaker (stronger) presence. Therefore, this finding
continues to support the substitute effect between shareholder coordination and the alternative governance
mechanism (blockholders).
In short, our results generally support the notion that the impact of shareholder coordination on price
informativeness is more significant when an alternative governance mechanism is weak.

Omitted variables
To mitigate the concern that our results are driven by omitted variables such as board characteristics and
managerial ownership, we add a variety of variables to our baseline model. Gul et al. (2011) find that board
gender diversity improves stock price informativeness. Ferreira et al. (2011) find that board structure and stock
price informativeness are related. Han, Jin, Kang, and Lobo (2014) find that managerial ownership is positively
associated with the quality of analyst reporting. Ferreira and Laux (2007) find a positive relation between
corporate governance and information flow. Therefore, we control board size (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵)), independent
board (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼), board gender diversity (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹), managerial ownership (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) and
governance index (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺) to augment our baseline regression model. The results are reported in columns (1)–
(4) and (7)–(10) of Table 6.

Table 6 Additional controls
(1)
Additional controls for
board characteristics,
managerial ownership,
G‐index and
institutional investors
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
0.148***
(3.92)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵)𝑡𝑡−1 0.128**
(2.36)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

0.148***
(3.92)
0.128**
(2.36)
0.011
(0.16)

0.149***
(3.95)
0.118**
(2.15)
−0.021
(− 0.29)
0.371***
(2.66)

0.186***
(4.11)
0.177***
(2.77)
−0.021
(− 0.24)
0.409**
(2.57)
0.329
(1.39)

0.100*
(1.84)
0.143
(2.02)
−0.024
(− 0.24)
0.385
(2.18)
0.249
(0.92)
0.008
(1.19)

0.075*
(1.76)
0.049
(0.70)

0.075*
(1.77)
0.047
(0.68)
−0.061
(− 0.62)

0.075*
(1.76)
0.048
(0.69)
−0.074
(− 0.75)
0.205
(1.14)

0.088
(1.46)
0.128
(1.37)
−0.027
(− 0.22)
0.348
(1.54)
−0.060
(− 0.21)

0.047
(0.64)
0.108
(1.08)
0.075
(0.52)
0.273
(1.10)
0.028
(0.08)
−0.020
(− 1.05)

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
12,836
0.610

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
12,836
0.611

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
8,037
0.627

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
6,119
0.605

0.129**
(2.16)
0.161**
(2.15)
0.034
(0.33)
0.298
(1.61)
0.220
(0.89)
0.010
(1.37)
−0.283**
(− 3.91)
0.237
(1.38)
−0.491*
(− 1.80)
−0.210
(− 1.18)
0.038
(0.47)
0.045
(0.35)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
4,938
0.611

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
12,836
0.719

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
12,836
0.719

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
12,836
0.719

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
8,037
0.735

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
6,119
0.731

0.061
(0.72)
0.088
(0.74)
0.074
(0.46)
0.350
(1.11)
−0.203
(− 0.52)
−0.018
(− 0.82)
0.023
(0.26)
−0.144
(− 0.64)
0.133
(0.31)
−0.186
(− 0.89)
0.127
(1.13)
0.005
(0.03)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
4,938
0.731

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−1

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)𝑡𝑡−1
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1
𝐵𝐵𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡−1

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1
Firm Controls
Year FE
Industry FE
Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R2

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
12,836
0.610

Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions with additional control variables. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝑅𝑅 2 ]/𝑅𝑅 2 ). We
include proxies from board characteristics and managerial ownership: 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 (the number of board members), 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (the ratio of number of

independent directors to board size), 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 (the percentage of female directors on board) and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (the percent of CEO ownership).
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 is governance index, which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions. We also add different proxies for the presence of institutional investors:
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (the number of institutional shareholders in a firm‐year), 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 (the ownership held by dedicated institutional investors), 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 (local
institutional ownership, where local institutions are defined as the institutions’ headquarters located within 150 miles of a firm's headquarters) and
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (the ownership held by independent institutional investors). 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 is ownership held by institutions whose ownership is above 5%.
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is ownership held by corporate insiders. Insiders are defined as a chief executive officer, other executive officers, and directors. Detailed
definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm level controls used in Table are included, but
coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity
and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

It might be the case that shareholder coordination is merely a variation of other forms of institutional ownership
such as number of institutional investors. Thus, we first add number of institutional investors (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁)) to
our baseline regression. We also control ownership by dedicated institutions (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷) as they are important
drivers of effective monitoring of managers. Gaspar and Massa (2007) find that local institutional investors, who
are geographically proximate to a firm's headquarters, are active in shaping corporate governance due to their
private information advantage. Similarly, Ayers et al. (2011) find local monitoring institutional investors are
effective at constraining earnings management and enhancing corporate disclosure quality. If local institutional
investors are effective monitors of corporate behavior, it is likely that the relation between shareholder
coordination and price informativeness is driven mainly by local institutions. Thus, we control for local
institutional ownership (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿) in the baseline regression. As independent institutional investors are also
important players in promoting corporate transparency, we also control ownership by independent institutional
investors (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). Brockman and Yan (2009) find that stock prices of firms with higher blockholder
ownership are more informative. We also examine whether our results are driven by blockholder ownership
(𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵). Evidence on the role of insiders shows a positive relation between insider trading and idiosyncratic
volatility (e.g., Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). Therefore, we control insider ownership (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) to augment
the baseline model. The results are reported in columns (5)–(6) and (11)–(12) of Table 6.
Results reported in Table 6 show that our results hold with some exceptions: in columns (10)–(12), results for
regression models with firm fixed effects are still positive but insignificant. Several reasons contribute to the
disappearance of significance. First, the design of the coordination measure is to capture the relatively stable
connection among institutional investors over time. If our shareholder coordination truly captures relatively
stable connection among institutional investors, including firm fixed effects would definitely absorb at least
some of the effects coming from shareholder coordination. Second, the inclusion of additional variables
significantly decreases our sample size. We lose nearly 58% of observations (from 19,028 to 8,037). Third,
adding a variety of other governance variables would cause multicollinearity problems. One of the features of
multicollinearity is that the standard errors of the affected coefficients tend to be large (e.g., Kumar, 1975). As a
result, the test of the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero may lead to a failure to reject a false null
hypothesis of no effect of the interested variable, a type II error. Moreover, sample size is an import factor in
determining the degree of multicollinearity (e.g., Farrar & Glauber, 1967). The severity of multicollinearity could
be mitigated in the presence of large sample size. As our sample size significantly decreases, the effect of
multicollinearity is magnified.
However, the alternative explanation for the insignificance is that shareholder coordination is merely a proxy for
the quality of the firm's corporate governance structure. The insignificant coefficient is due to the addition of
other relevant governance structure variables. We admit that we cannot completely rule out the possibility that
shareholder coordination could capture some latent governance structure variable, leading to the insignificance
once other governance structure variables are included. Therefore, we advise readers to interpret the results
with caution.

Establishing causality
As reverse causality can be a serious concern, the results so far do not allow us to draw a strong conclusion
regarding the relation between shareholder coordination and stock price informativeness. It is possible that
institutional investors do not invest randomly, so that what we label the ‘shareholder coordination effect’ may
just be a reflection of preferences by geographically clustered institutions favoring firms with stronger stock
price informativeness. To address this concern, in this subsection we perform two tests to provide evidence on
the direction of causality.

First, we follow Ramalingegowda and Yu (2012) by adding current and lead shareholder coordination into the
baseline regression model (equation ) to examine how stock price informativeness is related to lagged, current,
and lead shareholder coordination:

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽9 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽13 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (6)

In equation (6), 𝛽𝛽1 , 𝛽𝛽2 , and 𝛽𝛽3 capture the relation between stock price informativeness and lagged, current,
and lead shareholder coordination, respectively. If shareholder coordination improves stock price
informativeness, then we would expect 𝛽𝛽1 > 0. Conversely, if reverse causality explains our findings, we should
find 𝛽𝛽3 > 0. Evidence of 𝛽𝛽2 > 0 would be consistent with the simultaneity explanation. Panel A of Table 7
reports the results from estimating equation (6). The coefficient estimates of control variables are omitted for
brevity. The results are consistent with the notion that the direction of the positive effect is from shareholder
coordination to stock price informativeness, not vice versa. For example, in column ( 2) of Table 7 Panel A, 𝛽𝛽1 is
equal to 0.071 and significant at the 5% level. In contrast, and inconsistent with the reverse causality
explanation, we find that 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽3 are insignificant or significant with unexpected sign. One exception is that in
column (1) of Table 7 Panel A, 𝛽𝛽2 is significant and positive, indicating weak evidence supporting the
simultaneity explanation. However, as indicated in column (2) of Table 7 Panel A, 𝛽𝛽2 becomes insignificant once
we control for firm fixed effects rather than industry fixed effects.
Table 7 Reverse causality

Panel A: Lead‐lag Analysis
COORDt−1
COORDt

COORDt+1
Constant

Firm Controls
Year FE & Industry FE
Year FE & Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R2

Panel B: Change‐on‐change Analysis
ΔCOORDt−1
ΔIVt−1

ΔTotownt−1

ΔLn(Assets)t−1

(1)

(2)

0.075**
(2.15)
0.083**
(2.02)
0.036
(0.96)
7.497***
(18.06)
Yes
Yes
No
10,008
0.608
(1)

0.071**
(2.28)
−0.019
(− 0.37)
0.018
(0.43)
8.292***
(6.99)
Yes
No
Yes
10,008
0.763
(2)

(3)

𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝐭𝐭
0.085***
(2.85)

0.098***
(3.10)

𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝚫𝐭𝐭

−0.003
(− 0.95)
0.078
0.333*** 0.073***
(0.80)
(2.85)
(2.35)
−0.170*** −0.118*** 0.044***

(4)

−0.005
(− 1.36)
0.107***
(2.73)
0.050***

(− 5.75)
(− 3.23)
(4.40)
(3.99)
−0.258*** −0.248*** 0.009
0.012*
(− 14.86)
(− 12.60)
(1.54)
(1.89)
ΔROEt−1
−0.060*** −0.061*** 0.004
0.005
(− 3.07)
(− 2.75)
(0.41)
(0.51)
ΔStd. (ROE)t−1
0.018
0.014
−0.001
−0.002
(1.33)
(0.84)
(− 0.31)
(− 0.40)
ΔLeveraget−1
0.311
0.233
0.019
0.009
(3.42)
(2.18)
(0.67)
(0.29)
ΔLn(FirmAge)t−1
−0.470*** −1.230*** 0.066**
−0.053
(− 5.49)
(− 5.42)
(2.09)
(− 0.64)
ΔDivDumt−1
0.011
−0.004
−0.009
−0.017
(0.28)
(− 0.08)
(− 0.74)
(− 1.30)
ΔMultiSegt−1
−0.012
−0.013
0.009
0.010
(− 0.25)
(− 0.24)
(0.69)
(0.66)
ΔIn(DistHQ)t−1
0.551
0.554
−0.174
−0.225
(1.02)
(0.86)
(− 1.07)
(− 1.13)
ΔLn(Analyst)t+1
−0.040** −0.023
−0.025*** −0.014
(− 2.07)
(− 1.03)
(− 3.17)
(− 1.60)
Constant
−0.010
0.001
−0.011
0.006
(− 0.90)
(1.02)
(− 0.35)
(0.15)
Year FE & Industry FE
Yes
No
Yes
No
Year FE & Firm FE
No
Yes
No
Yes
Observations
15,999
15,999
11,701
11,701
0.195
0.138
0.024
0.136
Adj. R2
Notes: This table presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proxy for stock price
informativeness, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝑅𝑅 2 ]/𝑅𝑅 2 ). Panel A includes the lead
and contemporary weighted average distance among institutional shareholders, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+1 and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 . Panel
B report results of the change‐on‐change regression. Panel C reports the results of GMM analysis. Detailed
definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry, firm, and year dummies are included, but omit
coefficients to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test significance level at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
ΔLn(MB)t−1

In our second test, we adopt the change‐on‐change method that has been widely used in the literature (e.g.,
Aggarwal, Erel, Ferreira, & Matos, 2011; Chhaochharia et al., 2012). If the degree of shareholder coordination
has a significant influence on stock price informativeness as our results imply, then as shareholder coordination
increases over time, we would expect to see corresponding increases in stock price informativeness. If causality
runs only in this direction, then increases in stock price informativeness should not drive increases in
shareholder coordination.
To run the change‐on‐change regression model, we first replace the dependent variable 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 at t with the change
in 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 from 𝑡𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡𝑡 (∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼). Then we obtain the change in all control variables from 𝑡𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡𝑡 − 1. The
regression model is redefined as follows:

Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽2 Δ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽3 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛽𝛽4 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽5 Δ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽6 Δ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽7 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +

𝛽𝛽8 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽9 Δ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽10 Δ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡− 1 +
𝛽𝛽11 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽12 Δ𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (7)

To examine whether the reverse causality exists, we use Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 as the dependent variable and ∆IV as the
main independent variable of interest. Other control variables remain the same. More specifically, we run the
following model:

Δ𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼2 Δ𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼3 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼4 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼5 Δ𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼6 Δ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼7 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼8 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼9 Δ𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼10 Δ𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛼𝛼11 Δ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝛼12 Δ𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (8)

We are particularly interested in the estimate of 𝛽𝛽1 in equation (7) and 𝛼𝛼1 in equation. A positive and significant
𝛽𝛽1 and insignificant 𝛼𝛼1 would warrant that the relation between shareholder coordination and stock price
informativeness is not bi‐directional.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 Panel B report the results for regression models with changes in price
informativeness as the dependent variable and lagged changes in shareholder coordination as the main
independent variable, while columns (3) and (4) reports results with regressions with changes in coordination as
the dependent variable and lagged changes in price informativeness as the main independent variable. In
column (1) of Table 7 Panel B, 𝛽𝛽1 is equal to 0.085 and significant at the 1% level. In contrast, in columns (3) and
(4), the coefficient estimates on the change in idiosyncratic volatility (Δ𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) are not statistically significant,
indicating that changes in stock price informativeness do not have any effect on subsequent changes in
shareholder coordination. This evidence indicates that the causal link from shareholder coordination to stock
price informativeness is considerably stronger than the reverse causal relation.

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To solidify our findings, we perform a couple of robustness checks in this subsection. First, institutional investors
are highly geographically clustered. To address the concern that our results could be driven by institutions in
particular metropolitan areas such as New York and Boston, we reconstruct coordination measures without
institutions in above two metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). We choose these two MSAs because they
dominate the landscape of institutional investors. The results in Panel A of Table 8 show that our results
continue to hold.
Table 8 Robustness checks
Panel A: No NYC & Boston
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1

(1)

(2)

0.081***
(5.81)
Yes
Yes
No
19,028
0.644

0.066***
(4.70)
Yes
No
Yes
19,028
0.735

Firm Controls
Year FE & Industry FE
Year FE & Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R 2
Panel B: Control Prior Connection
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
0.009*** 0.008**

Firm Controls
Year FE & Industry FE
Year FE & Firm FE
Observations
Adj. R 2
Panel C: PIN
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1

(3.08)
Yes
Yes
No
19,028
0.530

(2.35)
Yes
No
Yes
19,028
0.696

0.019*** 0.015***
(4.44)
(3.66)
Firm Controls
Yes
Yes
Year FE & Industry FE
Yes
No
Year FE & Firm FE
No
Yes
Observations
19,028
19,028
Adj. R 2
0.492
0.643
Notes: This table reports three sets of robustness checks. In Panel A, we reconstruct 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 without
institutions located in New York and Boston and rerun the baseline regression. In Panel B, we control the proxy
designed to capture the prior connection via other shareholdings in other firms. In Panel C, we use 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 as an
alternative variable for stock price informativeness. Detailed definitions of other variables are listed in Appendix
A. Industry, firm, year dummies and other firm characteristics used in Table 3 are included, but omit coefficients
to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by
heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test significance level at
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Do prior connections among institutional shareholders drive our results? In other words, is the variable (COORD)
capturing prior connections or merely geographical proximity? To answer this question, drawing from the
literature, we devise a measure, weighted average correlation between institutions’ portfolios of stock holdings,
to proxy for connections among institutions. The intuition behind this measure is based on the premise that
institutions with similar portfolio allocations are more likely to share common investment philosophies and
therefore are also more likely to have developed connections. Pareek (2012) classifies mutual managers who
have large common portions in their portfolios as informationally connected. He also finds that mutual funds
trade together with other funds in their information network and the effect cannot be explained by style
invested and geographic location. The results in Panel B of Table 8 show that after controlling the connection
proxy, the coefficient estimate of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is still positive and significant but of a smaller magnitude, suggesting
that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 captures prior connections in common and beyond. Moreover, Pantzalis and Wang (2017) find that
shareholder coordination proxied by 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 acts as an information diffusion channel and causes a lead‐lag
relation in stock returns between firms with high shareholder coordination (strong connection or network) and
firms with low shareholder coordination (weak connection or network). Their findings are consistent with the
notion that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 captures prior connections rather than merely geographic proximity. In short, evidence in
Panel B of Table 8 and the literature suggest that rather than merely reflect geographic proximity among
institutional investors, our shareholder coordination measure (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) captures strength of connections
evolving over time.
In Panel C of Table 8, we use the alternative measure of stock price informativeness (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃) as the dependent
variable and rerun the baseline model. The results indicate that shareholder coordination still has a positive
impact on price informativeness.
To further address the endogeneity concern, we conduct the dynamic panel generalized‐method‐of‐moments
(GMM) analysis. GMM dynamic panel estimation is robust to endogeneity problems due to reverse causality,
simultaneity, and unobserved heterogeneity (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012). Appendix shows that our results

continue to hold. We find that COORD is significantly and positively related to price informativeness. Noticeably,
the GMM coefficient estimate (0.469) is much larger than the OLS coefficient estimate (0.106), which could be
due to a reduction in measurement error. Appendix shows the results of AR(1) and AR(2) tests of the null
hypothesis of no first or second order serial correlation, respectively. For our GMM estimates, if the
assumptions of our specification are valid, by construction the residuals in first differences (AR(1)) should be
correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)). Results of these tests confirm
that this is the case: the AR(1) test yields a 𝑝𝑝‐value of <0.01 and the AR(2) test yields a 𝑝𝑝‐value of 0.452.
Additionally, the Hansen test suggests that the instruments are valid (𝑝𝑝‐value = 0.361).

A POSSIBLE CHANNEL
In this section, we explore a possible channel through which shareholder coordination affects stock price
informativeness. Using the AIMR‐FAF annual corporate disclosure ratings, Gelb and Zarowin (2002) find that
greater disclosure is associated with stock prices that are more informative about future earnings. Haggard et al.
(2008) find that enhanced voluntary disclosure increases stock price non‐synchronicity. Higher disclosure quality
implies more accurate firm‐specific information is released to the public. The decreased information uncertainty
would create more incentives for investors to collect and trade on private information. Therefore, a high level of
shareholder coordination can influence stock price informativeness by improving corporate disclosure quality.
To examine whether firms with a high level of shareholder coordination are associated with high disclosure
quality, we elect the frequency of management earnings forecasts to proxy for corporate disclosure quality.[9]
Management earnings forecast has been widely used in the literature to capture the extent of voluntary
disclosure (e.g., Bamber & Cheon, 1998). Drawing from the literature (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005),
we design the regression model below:

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛾𝛾0 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾2 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾3 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝑐𝑐4 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾7 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛾𝛾8 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾9 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾10 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾11 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 +
𝛾𝛾12 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾13 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑑𝑑𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 , (9)
We control firm size (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)) because prior literature document a positive relation between firm size and
management earnings forecasts. Institutional ownership (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) is also controlled as literature provides
evidence in support of the monitoring role of institutional investors in enhancing corporate transparency (Chen
et al., 2007). Bamber and Cheon (1998) show that proprietary cost is related to management earnings forecasts.
Following the literature, here we use market‐to‐book ratio as a proxy to control it. Prior research (e.g., Lang &
Lundholm, 1993) find that firms using Big 5 auditors tend to have better disclosure. Thus we include Auditor to
capture the effect of top auditors on management earnings forecasts. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is a dummy variable that equals
1 if a firm uses one of the Big 5 auditors in that year, and 0 otherwise. Francis, Philbrick, and Schipper (1994) find
that shareholder litigation affects corporate disclosure quality. Therefore we add to our model 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿,
which equals 1 if a firms fall into an industry that is more vulnerable to shareholder litigation, and 0 otherwise.
Management's ability to forecast earnings would be circumscribed for firms making losses (e.g., Hayn, 1995). So
we include the dummy variable, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, which equals 1 if the firm reported losses, and 0 otherwise. Analyst
forecast dispersion would make it more difficult for managers to forecast earnings. Therefore, we control
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, in the regression model. We also control for analyst
coverage (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)) to account for the fact that analyst coverage is associated with corporate disclosure
quality. Literature has documented that the direction of earnings changes and earnings volatility are related to

management earnings forecast (e.g., Ajinkya et al., 2005; Waymire, 1985). Thus we include an earnings dummy
(𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷) and earnings volatility (𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸) in our regression model. Beta is added to control for market
risk. Heflin, Subramanyam, and Zhang (2003) find that managers issue more earnings forecasts after Regulation
FD. So our last control variable in our channel test model is 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm‐year
observation falls after year 2000, and 0 otherwise.

Our results in Panel A of Table 9 indicate that shareholder coordination has a positive impact on the frequency
of management earnings forecasts. Our results also suggest that shareholder coordination can directly improve
corporate disclosure quality by well‐coordinated monitoring effort and enhanced monitoring efficacy. Moreover,
the positive relation between shareholder coordination and the frequency of management earnings forecasts is
driven primarily by firms of relatively larger size, indicating that shareholder coordination affects voluntary
disclosure differently for firms of different sizes. Panel B of Table 9 also shows the effect of shareholder
coordination on stock price informativeness after controlling for management earnings forecasts. It is
noteworthy that earnings forecast itself is significant in all regressions, indicating that voluntary disclosure is
significantly positively associated with stock price informativeness. What's more important is that, although
shareholder coordination is significant with expected sign in all regressions, the positive relation between
shareholder coordination and price informativeness is much stronger and more significant in firms of small
size.[10] The implication of our results is that for large firms, shareholder coordination enhances price
informativeness mainly by inducing managers to increase value‐relevant voluntary disclosures; for small firms,
shareholder coordination affects price informativeness by facilitating price information collection and
incorporation.
Table 9 The possible channel

(1)
(2)
(3)
Full Sample Large Firms Small Firms

Panel A: Forecast Frequency
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1
0.184**
(2.31)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1
0.497***
(2.88)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1
0.236***
(7.51)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡−1
0.172***
(3.51)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡−1
0.020
(0.19)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
0.142***
(2.75)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
−0.046
(− 0.33)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
−0.558***
(− 9.73)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
−1.592
(− 1.55)
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1
−0.067**
(− 1.99)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1
0.000***
(3.18)
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1
−0.479***

0.269*
(1.78)
0.468
(1.52)
0.289***
(4.83)
0.162**
(2.14)
−0.394
(− 2.01)
0.024
(0.33)
−0.287
(− 1.15)
−0.507***
(− 5.26)
−6.130***
(− 4.85)
−0.113**
(− 2.31)
0.000**
(2.39)
−0.571***

0.021
(0.27)
0.774***
(4.26)
0.084
(1.58)
0.098*
(1.94)
0.069
(0.58)
0.235***
(3.44)
0.138
(0.89)
−0.546***
(− 8.30)
−0.586
(− 1.01)
−0.031
(− 0.74)
−0.004***
(− 2.93)
−0.305***

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1

Constant
Year FE
Industry FE
Observations
Adj. 𝑅𝑅 2
Panel B: 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1

(− 9.76)
−0.134
(− 1.17)
−2.888***
(− 5.36)
Yes
Yes
16,239
0.256

(− 6.44)
−0.326
(− 1.77)
−3.497***
(− 3.14)
Yes
Yes
8,094
0.284

(− 5.77)
0.146
(1.07)
−1.370**
(− 2.41)
Yes
Yes
8,145
0.232

0.158***
0.079*
0.170***
(4.34)
(1.69)
(3.68)
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1
0.020***
0.010**
0.018***
(4.64)
(2.13)
(2.91)
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1
−0.583*** −0.291*** −0.375***
(− 9.38)
(− 3.08)
(− 4.93)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.349*** −0.295*** −0.509***
(− 27.72)
(− 13.99)
(− 20.90)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.424*** −0.355*** −0.505***
(− 24.28)
(− 14.78)
(− 22.15)
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1
−0.045**
−0.072**
−0.044
(− 2.07)
(− 2.42)
(− 1.57)
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅)𝑡𝑡−1
0.057***
0.067***
0.049***
(5.90)
(4.44)
(4.60)
0.924***
0.981***
1.087***
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1
(13.54)
(10.19)
(12.32)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.033*
−0.050**
−0.007
(− 1.68)
(− 1.99)
(− 0.28)
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡−1
−0.039
−0.029
−0.033
(− 1.52)
(− 0.90)
(− 1.01)
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡−1
−0.018
−0.013
−0.025
(− 0.44)
(− 0.27)
(− 0.40)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.151
−0.240*
−0.187
(− 1.40)
(− 1.78)
(− 1.31)
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)𝑡𝑡−1
−0.181*** −0.107*** −0.199***
(− 9.77)
(− 4.70)
(− 7.68)
Constant
7.145***
5.349***
8.216***
(21.66)
(11.61)
(19.15)
Year FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Industry FE
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
19,028
9,492
9,536
2
0.644
0.566
0.587
Adj. R
Notes: This table reports the results of the channel test. Large/Small firms are classified based on the median
value. Panel A presents results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the frequency of
management earnings forecasts. Panel B reports the results of the coordination‐informativeness relation test
after including the frequency of management earnings forecasts as a control variable. Detailed definitions of
other variables are listed in Appendix A. Industry and year dummies are included, but omit coefficients to save
space. Numbers in parentheses are t‐statistics calculated using standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity

and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a two‐tailed test significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
To further bolster our findings in the channel test, we provide additional evidence by showing that shareholder
coordination also positively affects two alternative measures of voluntary disclosure (management forecast
occurrence and forecast precision).[11] Overall, our results suggest that shareholder coordination affects price
informativeness through enhancing corporate disclosure quality.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although the role of institutional investors in improving corporate transparency has been recognized by many
prior studies, the question of whether coordination among institutional shareholders can improve the corporate
information environment has not been fully answered. In this paper, we demonstrate that shareholder
coordination has implications for stock price informativeness. We use geographic proximity between
institutional investors as the basis for designing the measure of shareholder coordination. We find that a higher
degree of shareholder coordination is associated with more informative stock prices. The positive relation
between shareholder coordination and price informativeness stands up to a variety of endogeneity tests and
robustness checks. We also find that shareholder coordination plays a more important role when alternative
governance mechanisms are weak, suggesting that there is a substitution effect between shareholder
coordination and the existing governance mechanisms. We also propose a possible channel through which
shareholder coordination can affect stock price informativeness. Taken together, our results support the notion
that shareholder coordination improves stock price informativeness.
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Notes
1 For example, Lewellen (2011) documents that institutions in the 13F database held32% of total market value
at the beginning in 1980. The number increases to 68% by the end of 2007.
2 For example, in our sample, the number of institutions holding an average stock is 41 in 1994, but the number
increases to 131 in 2010.

3 Geographic proximity has been shown to be influential in the development of close relationships such as
dealings among floor traders (Baker, 1984), the forming of interlocked corporate boards (Kono, Palmer,
Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998), and investment patterns of venture capital firms (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001).
Finance literature has also shown that geographic proximity facilitates communication and the exchange
of ideas among mutual fund managers (e.g., Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Hong, Kubik, & Stein, 2005;
Ivković &Weisbenner, 2005). Therefore, geographic proximity among institutional shareholders is a
legitimate proxy for shareholder coordination.
4 Idiosyncratic volatility and probability of informed trading have been widely used as proxies for stock price
informativeness in the literature (e.g., Ferreira & Laux, 2007; Ferreira, Ferreira, & Raposo, 2011).
5 Bushee (1998) finds that the investment horizon of institutional investors is positively associated with a firm's
R&D spending that could create long-term value. Brickley et al. (1988) show that independent
institutional investors aremore likely to pass proposals on antitakeover amendments.
6 Corporate governance mechanisms can generally be classified into two categories: internal and external
governance mechanisms. Large shareholders and board directors are often viewed as the main internal
governance mechanisms (e.g., Franks & Mayer, 1996), while takeovers and the market for corporate
control are the main external governance mechanisms (e.g., Jensen, 1993).We view shareholder
coordination as the internal governance mechanism in that if institutional investors can coordinate with
ease, they can form a coalition and perform the role of large shareholders to mitigate the free-rider
problem in corporate monitoring.
7 We thank Brian Bushee for generously providing the institutional investor classification data.
8 In the following regression analysis, we take the simple average of shareholder coordination over the four
quarters in the past year, t−1.
9 AIMR-FAF rating data is available up to 1995 but our sample begins in 1994. In addition, one limitation with
AIMR-FAF ratings, as Healy and Palepu (2001) point out, is that ‘it is unclear whether the analysts on the
AIMR panels take the ratings seriously, how they select firms to be included in the ratings, and what
biases they bring to the ratings.’
10 The cross-equation coefficient equality test indicates that the difference between the two coefficients on
shareholder coordination is significant at the 5% level.
11 The results are not tabulated but available upon request.

APPENDIX A: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES
IV
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

Annual logistic transformed relative volatility estimated from the
Fama-French three factor model. [Data source: CRSP]
The inverse of the average of log(1 + weighted-average geographic
distance between institutional shareholders of the firm) in each firmquarter in year 𝑡𝑡 − 1, where weight is the ratio of ownership held by
institution 𝑖𝑖 to the total ownership held by all institutions in a firm at
quarter q. [Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings
(F13)]
Institutional shareholder coordination measured among independent
institutions (mutual funds and independent investment advisors).
[Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Institutional shareholder coordination measured among grey
institutions (bank trusts, insurance companies, and other institutions).
[Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Institutional shareholder coordination measured among dedicated
institutions (e.g. Bushee, 2001). [Data source: Thomson-Reuters
Institutional Holdings (F13)]
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𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿(𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹)
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𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑛𝑛

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑛𝑛
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑑𝑑

Institutional shareholder coordination measured among transient
institutions (e.g. Bushee, 2001). [Data source: Thomson-Reuters
Institutional Holdings (F13)]
The average percentage of aggregated share holdings by institutional
investors to total shares outstanding in year t−1. [Data source:
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Natural logarithm of total assets. [Data source: Compustat]
Natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio. [Data source:
Compustat]
Return on equity, calculated as earnings before extraordinary items
divided by book value of equity by the end of prior year. [Data source:
Compustat]
Standard deviation of ROE during the past 3 years. [Data source:
Compustat]
Leverage, defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. [Data
source: Compustat]
Natural logarithm of firm age, defined as the number of years since
the stock was included in the Compustat database. [Data source:
Compustat]
Dividend dummy, which equals 1 if the firm pays dividends, and 0
otherwise. [Data source: Compustat]
Diversification dummy which equals 1 when a firm operates in
multiple segments, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: Compustat]
The weighted average distance between institutions and a firm's
headquarters.
Natural logarithm of number of analysts following the firm in a year.
[Data source: I/B/E/S]
The number of institutional shareholders in a firm-year. [Data source:
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Ownership held by dedicated institutions. [Data source: ThomsonReuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Ownership held by institutions located within 150 mile radius of a
firm's headquarters. [Data source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional
Holdings (F13)]
Ownership held by independent institutional investors. [Data source:
Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Ownership held by institutions whose ownership is above 5%. [Data
source: Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (F13)]
Ownership held by corporate insiders. Insiders are defined as a chief
executive officer, other executive officers, and directors. [Data
source: Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)]
The number of board members. [Data source: CDA/Spectrum
Compact Disclosure and Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC)]
Ratio of number of independent directors to board size. [Data source:
CDA/Spectrum Compact Disclosure and Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC)]
The percentage of female directors on the board. [Data source:
CDA/Spectrum Compact Disclosure and Investor Responsibility
Research Center (IRRC)]

The percent of CEO ownership. [Data source: ExecuComp]
Governance index, which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions [Data
source: Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)]
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁
The probability of informed trading. [Data source:
https://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pindata].
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑦𝑦 Total number of earnings forecasts issued by a firm per year. [Data
source: First Call]
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
A dummy that equals1 if the company is audited by one of the Big 5
auditors, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: Compustat]
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛
A dummy that equals 1 for all firms in the biotechnology (2833–2836
and 8731–8734), computers (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics
(3600–3674), and retail (5200–5961) industries, and 0 otherwise.
[Data source: Compustat]
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑠𝑠
A dummy that equals 1 if the firm reported losses in the current
period, and 0 otherwise. [Data source: Compustat]
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑟𝑟
Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by the median
forecast. [Data source: I/B/E/S]
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸_𝐷𝐷
A dummy that equals 1 if the current-period EPS is greater than or
equal to the previous-period EPS, and 0 otherwise. [Data source:
Compustat]
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑙𝑙
Standard deviation of the operating earnings in the last five years.
[Data source: Compustat]
Market risk derived from a one-factor market model using daily stock
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎
return data. [Data source: CRSP]
A dummy that equals 1 if a firm-year observation is after 2000, and 0
𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷
otherwise. [Data source: Compustat]
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑛𝑛
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑥𝑥

APPENDIX B: GMM ANALYSIS
This table reports estimation results from the dynamic panel GMM estimation method. The dependent variable
is a proxy for stock price informativeness; IV is relative idiosyncratic risk measured as Ln([1 − 𝑅𝑅 2 ]/𝑅𝑅2 ). 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
is the weighted average distances among institutional shareholders and multiplied by −1. All variable definitions
are given in Appendix A. Industry (i.e., the first two-digit SIC code), firm, and year dummies are included, but
coefficient estimates are omitted to save space. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics calculated using
standard errors adjusted by heteroskedasticity and clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * indicate a twotailed test significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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